Egypt's Parliamentary Elections: Nothing Revolutionary

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Egypt's Parliamentary Elections: Nothing Revolutionary

gypt's Parliamentary Elections: Nothing Revolutionary
Magdy Samaan

Egypt’s first parliamentary elections post-revolution is like old wine in new bottles. The public came out in droves to participate, but the participating parties employed tactics no different than those of the previous era. The elections revealed that the original revolutionary forces remain a minority, and despite an unprecedented turnout – some 52% of eligible voters – it appears that nothing has changed with regard to contempt for the will of the voting populace.

Indeed, these elections – the first round of which occurred on the 28^th of November and are slated to run in stages through to the 10^th of January – saw the continuation of many of the old Mubarak-era practices such as vote-buying in the form of care packages for the poor, campaigning outside and even inside polling stations, and observed vote counting irregularities. Add to these violations the widespread exploitation of the religion card, a tactic hitherto unseen in the country, while the number of allegations of election infractions are already compounding. This list of violations calls into question the veracity of the elections as well as the legitimacy of the council which will now oversee the enactment of a new constitution.

Additionally, a number of question marks remain concerning the Islamist trend’s commitment to respect the rules of the democracy game: respecting the equality of all citizens, their rights and freedoms, and accepting the notion of diversity. This also includes the operational component of democracy, which the trend supposedly bought into, but as exemplified by these elections, even this component was disregarded. Parties of the Islamist trend were the ones most broadly responsible for violations such as indirect vote-buying in the form of care packages for the poor and exploiting religion by portraying themselves as the ones who represent Muslims (and, by inference, accusing the secular trend of standing in the Christian camp), sounding notes of sectarianism. The question remains: if the Islamist trend hasn’t upheld the rules of democracy, and it hasn’t yet come to power, what will the situation be when it controls the reins of power in the country?

The revolutionary forces returned to Tahrir on the 19^th of November, in confrontations reminiscent of the January uprising, resulting in forty-two deaths and around two hundred injured over the course of 10 days. Protests spread to nearly every governorate and very nearly revoked the legitimacy of the SCAF altogether, prompting some to term this the ‘second wave’ of the revolution. In addition, it almost caused the establishment of a civil national salvation government to run the country. And now, just in the nick of time, the elections have emerged, appropriating legitimacy from Tahrir Square, obliterating the 'second wave' and sending revolutionary protestors back to square one. The SCAF once again holds the reins, and the undemocratic forces -- embodied by the Islamists – have been given the upper hand in deciding the fate of the constitution, which will determine the rules of the political game for the country.

Thus the youth who led the revolution last January and who came out again on November 19^th have returned to the status of opposition, while at the same time there is the sense that the message of change has not yet resonated with the grassroots base of the public who largely lay the blame for the country’s instability at the feet of Tahrir Square. Now those camping out in the square with slogans like ‘No Sound Above That of Tahrir’ have become the voice of a limited minority which feels it is putting forth the sacrifices while others of differing opinions reap the benefits to craft the system of governance. The youth see this as authoritarianism in another guise, following the revolution to a fork in the road, only to ready themselves to pounce and capitalize on it at the right time.

The current elections, then, are the culmination of years of the July Officers rule, during which we saw the Islamicization of Egyptian society and the spread of sectarian sentiment, having previously been inclined towards centrist liberalism prior to 1952. And even in the event that the political powers are able to draft a democratic constitution which guarantees fair and transparent criteria for political competition, the road ahead for secular trends and parties remains a long one. In this upcoming period, the upper hand, it seems, will rest with the Islamists, who have found support from the remnants of the old regime, locally and abroad.

Does the Secular Trend Have the Savvy to Play the Democracy Game?
Mohamed Abdelbaky

The first round of Egypt’s first democratic elections in decades has come to a close, and predictions that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) would obtain the lion’s share of parliamentary seats proved to be correct. The real surprise was the amount of support the Salafists received at the ballot box, with more than a quarter of first round voters casting their ballot in favor of the Salafist’s Nour Party list and its candidates.

Secular trends and parties received the results with a mixture of despair and fear, likening the Islamist claims of gaining approximately 65% of first round seats to a dark cloud preventing the figurative rays of democracy from shining on Egypt. Likewise, this development might slam the door tightly against the winds of change and the success of the revolution, whose emergence was anticipated with the end of the transition period following the election of a president.

Since the revolution, it has been evident that the MB and the Islamists have been the most adept in the understanding of the maxims of the democracy game, realizing that the only path to legitimacy is through the ballot box. The so-called civil (i.e. non-religiously based) forces, meanwhile, have preoccupied themselves with protesting in Tahrir Square and infighting over peripheral issues such as the supra-constitutional principles and the trial of the former president.

The liberals’ and secularists’ exaggerated stance of shock and surprise hardly seems justified, frankly. Indeed, since the referendum on constitutional reforms last March for which Egyptians voted in favor by more 75% (with the MB supporting the ‘in favor’ vote), all indications have been that the MB would make unprecedented gains in parliamentary elections. It was manifestly clear that the group was gearing up for election day from the first moments of the fall of the Mubarak regime.

On the ground, there simply is no denying that in most provinces of the country, the MB has been the political faction since the 1984 elections in terms of organization and affinity with the average citizen. For three decades, they have had more political presence than even the former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).

The liberal, left and centrist trends, on the other hand, know nothing of the Egyptian citizenry, contenting themselves with interacting with them via the internet, a medium that remains the domain of a limited segment of society – the comfortable set, largely – whose electoral power does not exceed 5% of eligible voters.

The performance of the Nour Party warrants some explanation as well, given that a few short months ago, they were absent from the political arena, only to obtain a quarter of first round parliamentary seats, strengthening the hand of the Islamists in the post-Mubarak era. It appears that the Islamists have a new weapon to wield against the secular, ‘civil’ trend.

It’s worth pointing out that the Nour Party relied primarily on a social charity network which has been existent for more than a century, offering millions of citizens assistance in areas where successive governments have been unable to reach. The Nour Party has looked to this network for funding and has used it to mobilize the masses to get out and vote. So-called ‘rightful cooperatives’ have been the fundamental component of the network, a governorate-wide phenomenon, with smaller collectives in smaller villages.

These associations – though their members might have differences with the Salafist school of thought that founded the Nour Party – were the secret to the trend’s success in the first round, particularly given that, in conjunction with other Salafist groups, they controlled the mosques in most villages and rural cities.

Despite the blunders of the secular powers from the start of the revolution, leftists and liberals were able to make some gains in this first round. The Egyptian bloc, for instance, obtained 15% of first round seats, some eighteen positions (individual and list). The bloc is a coalition of three parties – the liberal Free Egyptians, the Egyptian Social Democratic party and the leftist Progressive Unionist party. The Revolution Continues alliance – a coalition of leftist parties – gained four seats (list-based, no individual seats) with 3.5% of voters’ support.

With the exception of the cities of Fayoum and Asyut, the Egyptian bloc assumed second or third place in all provinces to the Freedom and Justice party (the official party wing of the MB) and the Salafist’s Nour Party. Cairo, Alexandria and Damietta were the backbone of the liberals’ support base, while there was fair support for the bloc in Port Said, Kafr el-Sheikh, the Red Sea and Luxor.

These indices show that the bloc succeeded best where levels of education are high, or where there are significant Christian populations. The same could be said of ‘The Revolution Continues,’ except to note that they were particularly strong in areas where there are high concentrations of workers like in Damietta and Port Said, but were otherwise weak and scattered in other provinces.

Considering the total gains of the non-religious parties, we see that they garnered approximately 33 parliamentary seats in the first round. Add to this the 4.5% taken by the Wasat Party (a party of Islamist origin, known however for its antagonism to the MB), which received half a million votes among the well-educated who “aspire to a ‘civil’ state and the spread of liberal thought based on the customs and traditions of Egyptian society,” as their campaign literature says.

The remnants of the NDP secured no more than 1.5% of the total vote, a clear sign that those designated ‘old regime’ have no standing. Most of the so-called ‘remnants’ chose to run as individuals, and we will see them most prominently in the third and final round, but they are predicted to secure no more than 20 seats at best.

The results of this first round have given a clear picture of the strengths of Islamists and non-religious competitors on the ground and their respective abilities to claim legitimacy via the ballot box. The next two rounds will be the true test for the non-religious parties. They have the chance to correct their mistakes, retrieve whatever can be regained, and prove how quickly they can get up to speed on the democracy game.

If things continue as they’re currently going, however, the Islamists will take the majority, which will, in my opinion, make them the biggest loser here. In one respect, they will have the upper hand in crafting the constitution, an advantage, to be sure. But on the negative side, they will have to satisfy popular opinion, which broadly could care less about constitutions or elections and is rightly more concerned with improving economic and social conditions. Neither the Brotherhood nor the Salafists have the magic wand to pull off that trick

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