The Struggle among the Earthly, Man-Made Religions of the Muhammadans during the Ottoman Caliphate a
ßÊÇÈ A Historical Overview of the Emergence and Development of the Earthly Religions of the Muhammadans:
CHAPTER V

في السبت ٢٣ - نوفمبر - ٢٠٢٤ ١٢:٠٠ صباحاً

CHAPTER V: The Struggle among the Earthly, Man-Made Religions of the Muhammadans during the Ottoman Caliphate and the Dominance of the Sunnite Sufism

 

A general overview of the Ottoman caliphate:

Different views regarding the Ottoman caliphate:

1- Some researchers never see anything in the Ottoman caliphate but tyranny, injustice, backwardness, massacres, obscurantism, and imposed poverty and ignorance because of never contacting the outside world of non-Muhammadans. Some other researchers assert that the Ottoman caliphate stopped the Portuguese and Spanish troops from reaching Arabia, the Red Sea, and North Africa, as these troops allegedly desired to reach Jeddah to conquer Arabia and then destroy the Kaaba in Mecca and the Yathreb mosque mausoleum ascribed falsely to Muhammad.     

2- In fact, the Ottoman caliphate was not unique in tyranny, corruption, and injustices in comparison to previous caliphates and contemporary kingdoms around it that belonged wither to Europeans or to the Muhammadans. The only difference is that the Ottoman caliphate struggled many times against European powers. The Ottoman caliphate never imitated the European renaissance and reform, and this was one of the causes of its decline and weakness until European powers managed to put an end to it in 1924 A.D.    

3- Three overlapping factors of location, era, and religious influence define the view pertaining to how to judge the history of the Ottoman caliphate.

(A) As for its location, the Ottoman caliphate commenced within Asia Minor and not within the heart of the Arab world (unlike the Umayyad, Abbasid, and Fatimid caliphates). Asia Minor was the battlefield of the military struggles between the Byzantines and the Muhammadans, and this led the Ottomans in their early decades to attack Europe several times in the name of jihad and to annex lands in order to secure Asia Minor. 

(B) As for its era, the Ottoman caliphate emerged within a time when major 'old' states of the Seljuks, the Mamelukes, and the Byzantines collapsed. The Ottomans in their early decades defeated the troops of the Portuguese and Spanish, but when they grew weak, they could not face GB and France. The Ottomans could not stop European colonial powers from invading the Arab world and stealing its wealth. As Europeans had confiscated the wealth of the New World, they were bent on having their revenge against the Ottoman Turks and expelling them from Europe forever. Even Russians coveted more Ottoman lands to seek locations in warm seas and desired to free the Slavic nations in the Balkans. As the Ottomans sank in obscurantism and backwardness, the European renaissance and advancement in all fields gave the West more power and they were bent on destroying the Ottoman caliphate that had threatened Europe before and crushed the Byzantines.    

(C) As for its religious influence, the struggle between Europe and the Ottoman caliphate had its religious dimension; before the emergence of the Ottomans, crusaders had their kingdoms in Asia Minor and the Levant before being defeated and chased away by the Mamelukes, and the Muhammadans fought in Andalusia (Iberian Peninsula) and were defeated and chased away by the Spanish and the Portuguese. The Mamelukes later on were busy in their internal struggles, while the Spanish and the Portuguese fought the Muhammadans in North Africa and sought to reach India and Arabia and to negotiate with Abyssinia to prevent the Nile River from reaching Sudan and Egypt. Within this climate of many struggles, the Ottoman caliphate emerged and its expansion made Europeans lose lands in Eastern Europe, where the Byzantines were located. Thus, the Christians Europeans found themselves facing the fearful enemy of the Sufi Sunnite Ottomans who raised the banner of 'Islam' in invade European lands in the name of jihad. This is why Europe managed to take revenge and destroy the Ottoman caliphate when the Ottomans grew weak.      

4- The Ottoman caliphate lasted more than 6 centuries and its troops attacked south-east and middle of Europe to make such regions submit to 'Muslim' rule and this was unprecedented, of course. Hijacking the name of Islam, the Ottoman caliphate achieved several stunning victories that frightened Europeans and made them revive the feelings of crusades to defeat the Ottomans in some battles, until the Ottomans grew weak and the Europeans grew too powerful and put an end to the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 A.D. This struggle between the West and the Ottoman caliphate was accompanied by ideological conflict; European historians attacked the Ottoman caliphate and drew heavily on claims of racial superiority and on religious sentiments; this led them to distort history of the Ottoman caliphate, and traces of this are found in reformist authors among the intelligential and the cultural elite members in the Arab world, especially in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Tunisia, within the battle of modernization linked to being open to the West culture and to attack intellectual stagnation caused by the Ottoman caliphate with its tyranny, obscurantism, and old traditions. Within its decades of weakness, the Ottomans committed the massacres of the Armenians at the time when Church schools from the USA and France were opened in the Levant and led to the creation of a class of Westernized cultured Christian Arabs. This caused the emergence of intellectual trends of the cultural elite members who called for reform on all levels and for separating their countries from the Ottoman caliphate based on Arab nationalism. In contrast, Gamal Eddine Al-Afghani attempted to urge 'Muslims' to preserve the unity under the Ottoman caliphate, and the Ottoman sultan Abdul-Hamid II attempt to save his empire by threatening GB and France by inciting 'Muslims' of North Africa and India against them.       

   The collapse of the Ottoman caliphate did NOT end the heated intellectual debate concerning it; those who sought to revive the notion of theocratic caliphate defend the Ottoman caliphate after its collapse and find pretexts for its mistakes. In contrast, secular Arab thinkers and nationalists magnify the defects and errors of the Ottoman caliphate because of its tyranny and corruption. Both sides tend to forget that the stagnation and backwardness of the Ottomans were because of the Sunnite Sufism, assumed at the time to be 'Islam'. This is the religion learned by the Ottomans who were originally simple Turkish tribes brought to the Arab world to be trained in warfare while adopting Sunnite Sufism among other customs and ways of the Muhammadans. Yet, the Ottomans had no excuse for rejecting reform and advancement and refuting to imitate the European renaissance.    

 

The establishment and development of the Ottoman caliphate:

 The Steppes areas caused historical changes within an international level in Europe and the Middle East, and both the Muhammadans and Europeans paid the heavy price for it; the Mongols and the Tartars came from the Asian Steppes and attacked Europe and the Arab world, and Mongol empire caused the death of millions of people in Asia. Turkish tribes had to relocate several times to avoid the Mongols and the Tartars who attacked Asia Minor. The Ottomans belonged to a Turkish tribe that witnessed accidentally, during its mobility within Anatolia in 1232 A.D., a huge army of the Mongols led by Aqtay son of Genghis Khan fighting a weak army of the Turkish Seljuks, and they joined the Seljuk troops and made them victorious. The Seljuk sultan rewarded the Turkish tribal leader Tughril, who helped the Seljuks in this battle, by appointing him as a governor of a border province; Tughril raised the banners of jihad to raid and attack the Byzantines, whose state was on the verge of collapse, to annex more lands to himself. After he conquered the city of Eskisehir, Tughril died at the age of 93, and his son and successor Othman ruled instead in 1299 A.H., whose name gave the Ottoman caliphate its name. The Mongols – unwittingly – drove this Turkish tribe that ruled in the name of the Seljuk sultan to rule independently when they attacked the Seljuk state and caused its collapse; Othman announced his independent rule, organized his government and military forces, bought slaves to train them in warfare, got married to princesses to win their dynasties to his side, and he appointed the highly qualified and experienced leaders; e.g., the Byzantine Mikhail who rejected Christianity and converted to the religion of the Ottomans was appointed by Othman as high-rank military leader. Shortly before he died in 1326 A.D., Othman annexed more lands by fighting the Byzantines until his troops reached the Bosporus, and he wrote his will and testament to his son, Orhan, to move his tomb to Prussia inside the church of a palace (turned into a mosque later on). Thus, Othman firmly established his state with good policies that helped powerful sultans of his descendants, within fierce military nature and highly religious spirit, and within a special geographical location in the midst of political entities on the verge of collapse.                   

 

A brief historical overview of the expansion of the Ottoman Empire:

1- The greatest Ottoman sultans/caliphs are only ten; the first on was Othman and the last one in the list was Suleiman the Magnificent, and these ten sultans ruled for about 267 years and annexed more regions within the military conquests in Asia, Africa, and Europe while establishing political, administrative, and military systems that made them very powerful within this Ottoman empire. The rest of the 26 Ottoman sultans begin with Selim II, son of Suleiman the Magnificent, and end in Mehmet VI, and they ruled for about 357 years (1566 – 1920 A.D.), and during this period, no more expansionist endeavors were pursued and the defeats occurred as the sultans and the caliphate grew weak, and many provinces separated from the State and European colonizers in Africa and Asia put an end to the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 A.D. The reasons behind this degeneration include promiscuous, weak caliphs who never cared to develop the empire to face new conditions of the rising European powers; political life was dominated by the seraglio of the Ottoman sultans, eunuchs, military leaders of the Janissaries, and power centers. The golden era for the Ottoman empire ended when Suleiman the Magnificent died in 1566 A.D., after he made his empire reach it zenith in military and political power within more expansions. The rest of the ottoman sultans were weak, lazy, and promiscuous; they never cared about losing regions in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 was the first one to be imposed on Europe on the Ottoman State after its defeat, and other unjust treaties came along and the Ottoman empire deteriorated gradually for 150 years. The Berlin Conference of 1878 was the commencement of the downfall of the Ottomans, as their caliphate was attacked by Russia, Austria, Hungary, GB, France, and the Balkans. Abdul-Hamid II managed to control the Ottoman caliphate within harsh conditions but he was dethrone within a coup d'état in 1909, bur leaders of this coup who reached power were defeated, and this resulted in the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate after WWI, after the Armistice of Mudros in 1918 and the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. The Turkey of today is only what remains of the Ottoman State.     

2- The Ottoman caliphate occupies a large chunk of history of the Muhammadans and Europeans, as it ruled regions in Asia, Africa, and Europe. At its early decades, the Ottoman caliphate had the strongest, most organized military troops with the best training and arms, as such troops moved through Anatolia to Europe in 1356 during the reign of Orhan to invade Greece, Peloponnese (Morea), Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Transylvania, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Albania, and Montenegro. The Ottomans even attempted to invade Vienna, the Austrian capital; this has been an unprecedented thing that an army of the Muhammadans would reach the heart of Europe. The weak Ottoman caliphate became the sick man of Europe later on, and European powers vied in distributing its regions among themselves. If it had not been for the wish of GB to allow this sick man of Europe to remain alive for a while, the Ottoman caliphate would have ended in the 19th century instead of the 20th century.        

 

The Ottoman caliphate of 'Islam' and the Muhammadans in a general overview:

 The Sufi Sunnite Ottomans fought against the Shiite Safavids of Iran, who were ruled by Shah Ismail the Safavid (1501 – 1524 A.D.) who was the real founder of the Safavid dynasty and managed to spread the Shiite religion in Iraq and eastern part of Anatolia, the original birthplace of the Ottomans. Shiites in Anatolia who joined the troops of the Safavids were called the Qizilbash, which means "the redheads". The Ottoman sultan Selim I (1512 - 1520 A.D.) decided to crush this Shiite threat, and he defeated the troops of Shah Ismail in 1514 in the battle ofChaldiran. In 1515, Selim I conquered Tabriz, the capital of the Safavids, and this drove Shah Ismail to flee and take hiding in the middle of Iran. Selim I invaded Armenia,Diyarbakır, Tbilisi, Mesopotamia until Mosul, and parts of the Levant until Al-Raqqa. This undermined the Safavid state, and Selim I returned to Istanbul to prepare for the military endeavors to invade the Arab world provinces.

    

The Ottoman conquest of the Levant and Egypt:

 Selim I invaded the rest of the Levantine region, and the Mameluke sultan Al-Ghoury, who ruled the Levant and Egypt, was defeated in the battle of Marj Dabiq in 1516 A.D. Selim I conquered Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Damascus, and Palestine. Selim defeated the last Mameluke sultan, the Circassian Tuman Bay, in the battle of Ridaniya in 1517 A.D./ 921 A.H. and he conquered Cairo in the same year, putting Tuman Bay to death and ending the Mameluke sultanate.    

 

The Ottoman conquest of Hejaz and Yemen:

 During the stay of Selim I in Cairo, he received the delegation of notables sent by the prince of Mecca, Al-Sharif Barakat, to announce their acceptance of the Ottoman rule of Hejaz region peacefully without fighting, and the son of the prince gave Selim I the keys of the Kaaba and some items allegedly owned before by Prophet Muhammad. Princes of Yemen surrendered peacefully to the Ottoman rule in the same manner; hence Egypt, the Levant, Hejaz, and Yemen were conquered by the ottomans in one year (within 1516 – 1517) and this made the Red Sea an Ottoman lake, especially when the Ottoman sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (1520 – 1566 A.D.), son of Selim I, conquered Sawakin, in Sudan, and moved southward to conquer Abyssinia in 1557 A.D., seizing he chance of civil wars there. This made the Ottomans lessen the pressure of the Portuguese on coastal Arab cities and Arab merchants; the Ottomans crushed all endeavors by the Portuguese to form a Christian front to face the Ottomans in the Red Sea and Africa. Suleiman the Magnificent conquered Iraq in 1534 A.D., and then Aden, Al-Ahsa, and all of the Gulf region in Arabia; he also conquered Tripoli (i.e., Libya), Tunisia, and Algeria. This added the needed Arab flavor (by conquering major Arab cities with centuries-old history and heritage: Cairo, Mecca, Yathreb, Damascus, Baghdad, Kairouan, Kufa, and Basra) to the Ottoman empire that previously had an Anatolian, European, non-Arab flavor.

 

The political nature of the Ottoman rule:

 The Ottomans never cared for the internal affairs of its provinces in the fields of agriculture, trade, transportation and routes, ports, education, health, facilities, etc., and they did not cope with developments taking place in Europe. The Ottomans exercised their authority within a narrow scope: to appoint trusted governors in all provinces, preserve internal security, to collect taxes indirectly using local employees, and to make all judges in courts adhere to the Abou Hanifa doctrine. Thus, the sovereignty of the Ottomans did not influence its subjects, and no radical changes occurred in all provinces; people were allowed to keep their languages, religions, lifestyles, etc., and even some local representatives shared rule with the Ottoman governors to guarantee the collection of the annual taxes and tributes. This is why the Ottoman governors of Egypt allowed the Mameluke princes to rule governorates in the name of the Ottoman sultan. The Mameluke prince Ali Bey Al-Kabir tried to rule Egypt independently for a short duration, but Egypt was retrieved to the Ottoman rule by another Mameluke prince named M. Bey Abou Al-Dhahab. Since the Ottomans retained the Mameluke princes to rule Egyptian governorates in their name, the social, religious, and economic conditions remained the same as they were during the Mameluke sultanate. The Ottomans, after all, were mere Turkish tribes who had no civilizational background to cause cultural or intellectual changes; this is why they converted to Sunnite Sufism as if it were Islam and they never knew Islam of Prophet Muhammad. The Ottomans liked the Sunnite jihad (i.e., invasion, conquests, looting, sabotage, enslavement, rape, and tax-collecting from the poor) in order to establish an empire by oppressing people (i.e., Muhammadans [Shiites and Sunnites] or Christian Europeans). This crime that contradict the Quran (i.e., Islam) began first by the Qorayish caliphs like Abou Bakr and Omar.  

 

Features of Sunnite Sufism during the Ottoman Era:

1- Sunnite features: the grand mufti, called ''sheikh of Islam'' at the time, was the highest rank within the Ottoman Era; he was supervising all judiciary and religious institutions and issued fatwas for the sultans, especially regarding waging wars or making treaties. The notion of jihad made religious authorities play a role in preparing soldiers for battles. The Ottomans was keen on applying traditional Salafist, Sunnite sharia as per the Abou Hanifa doctrine. The Ottoman authority never allowed anyone eating in public during days of the fasting month and it organized pilgrimage to Mecca, and though the Ottomans never interfered in the internal affairs of any provinces, they made caring for pilgrims a priority by digging wells, building hotels, and guarding the four regular annual caravans of pilgrims, coming from all the corners of the Ottoman empire, by military troops led by the prince of pilgrimage.   

 

2- Sufi features: the Ottomans allowed Sufi sheikhs in their Sufi orders to exercise their authority and control freely over their followers and disciples. Sufi orders increased in number all over Egypt and the masses were more obedient and loyal to Sufi sheikhs more than officials and statesmen of the Ottomans. Of course, the Ottomans patronized and sponsored many Sufi orders in turkey, Egypt, and elsewhere; e.g., Al-Ahmady order, Al-Rifaai order, Naqshbandi order, Bektashi order, Khalwati order, and Mevlevi order. Mehmed II the Conqueror made use of the myth that a companion of Muhammad, named Abou Ayoub, participated in the Umayyad siege of Constantinople in 670 A.D. and died there, to boost the morale of his troops; he spread the rumor of finding the tomb of Abou Ayoub near the wall of Constantinople. This fake tomb was turned into a 'holy' mausoleum surrounded by a mosque by Mehmed II, and this religious spirit made the troops fight hard until they conquered Constantinople. Mehmed II turned the famous church of Aya Sofia into a grand mosque, and renamed Constantinople as Istanbul. This Sunnite jihad – done falsely in the name of Islam – posed a threat to Europe; they Europeans feared that Mehmed II was bent on invading Europe – in the name of all Muhammadans – to avenge the crusades that conquered the Levant (defeated by the Mamelukes) and for losing Andalusia to the Spanish and the Portuguese. Mehmed II thus established the tradition that every new Ottoman sultan must be enthroned by visiting this mausoleum within celebrations and pompous processions to receive the sword of Othman (i.e., their forefather) by the Sufi sheikh of the Mevlevi order to assert their theocratic, spiritual authority.    

 

(N.B.: the historical facts are quoted from a book, in Arabic, about refuting myths about the Ottoman caliphate by the late Dr. Abdel-Aziz Al-Shennawi, professor of history at Al-Azhar University, but the analysis of these facts is ours. The pages from which we quoted the historical facts are as follows: 28, 29, 33, 34, 35, 39, 40, 54-59, 64, 186-190, and 345).

 

The Ottoman policies in dealing with Shiites inside the Ottoman Empire:

 Within the Ottoman war against the Shiite Safavids of Iran, the Ottomans drove away all Shiites of Anatolia and stopped the Shiite proselytization and call in most Arab provinces especially in Egypt. Yet, Iraq was an exception as the Safavids spread their Shiite doctrine there and because Iraq contains holy sites and mausoleums for Shiites. Thus, Shiites were the majority of Iraqis at the time who adhered staunchly to their own religious and social traditions and customs and never accepted Sunnite Sufism. When Suleiman the Magnificent conquered Iraq in 1534 A.D., he stayed for four months in Baghdad and managed to please and gratify Iraqi Shiites and Iraqi Sunnites, and he established institutions for both Sunnites and Shiites. This Ottoman sultan visited the mausoleum of Abou Hanifa (after fixing it, because it was desecrated and destroyed by Persian Shiites) and the holy Shiite mausoleums, especially in Karbala and mausoleum of Ali in Najaf, to worship at them, and he built a wall to stop irrigation water from damaging Karbala mausoleums. Moreover, he widened a water canal to allow more irrigation water to serve orchard around Shiite mausoleums. This means that Suleiman the Magnificent adopted policies toward Iraqi Shiites and Sunnites that showed how wise, sage, open-minded, and shrewd he was.          

 

The influence of the Sunnite-Shiite conflict on the collapse of the Mameluke sultanate and bringing the Ottomans in Egypt:

The struggle between the Sunnite Sufi Ottoman Empire and the Shiite Safavid Empire in Iran

The emergence of Shah Ismail the Safavid as a danger threatening both the Mamelukes and the Ottomans:

Introduction:

1- Most of the Muhammadans during the Ottomans were dominated by the earthly religion of Sunnite Sufism; yet, the Shiite earthly religion challenged all attempted of uprooting it, especially in Persia and Iraq; it is linked to Persian nationalism and Persian Shiites spread their religion among some Arab Muhammadans in many eras (as per the book of Al-Malti), but Sufism always claims the biggest number of adherents as it remains situated in the middle of both camps of Shiites and Sunnites.  

2- Sufism needed the protection of the Sunnite religion and the Sunnite rulers aimed to contain Sufism and inject the Sunnite religion inside it to face Shiite ideology: this led to the hybrid religion of Sunnite Sufism. Likewise, Shiites who practiced their Taqiyya in the midst of Sunnite societies had to hide behind the façade of Sufism invented by them: this led to the hybrid religion of Shiite Sufism. Shiite Sufism has existed first before Sunnite Sufism; this means that Sufism is the descendant of Shiite religion first. This is why there had to be clear boundaries between Sunnite Sufism and Shiite Sufism. Within Sunnite Sufism, the Sufi features eclipsed the Sunnite fiqh element; the latter is manifested in acts of worship and within judges of courts, whereas Sufism controlled the tenets, notions, culture, thought, and social life. In contrast, within Shiite Sufism, the Sufi element was a thin veneer, as Shiite tenets and notions dominated the core in every aspect. This Sufi thin veneer allowed Shiites to infiltrate secretly some societies to deceive them through Sufism to convert to the Shiite religion. Sufism has been the common element of religious and cultural life of the Muhammadans throughout the centuries of the Mameluke and Ottoman eras.           

3- The Ottomans assumed they had embraced 'Islam' officially and formally, but in fact, they embraced the religion that dominated Anatolia at the time: Sunnite Sufism. The Ottomans had to be part of the struggle between Sunnite Sufism and Shiite Sufism, as the latter posed a threat by a fierce foe; namely, the Shiite Safavid dynasty of Persia ruled by Shah Ismail. 

4- The fierce struggle between the Ottomans and the Safavids was between the earthly religions of Sunnite Sufism and Shiite Sufism. The vast majority of the Muhammadans were Sufi Sunnites and the Ottomans maintained this; yet, the Shiite Sufism was never annihilated though the Ottomans defeated the Safavids, and this defeat brought about its collapse later on. In fact, the struggle between the Ottomans and the Safavids resulted in the collapse of the Sunnite Mameluke sultanate whose regions were conquered by the Ottomans who led Sunnite world. Thus, the young Ottoman caliphate brought about the downfall of the old Sunnite Mameluke State after the Ottomans defeated and killed Al-Ghoury, the Mameluke sultan in Egypt, in the battle of Marj Dabiq in 933 A.H.      

5- Both of the Ottomans and the Mamelukes at first formed a political alliance to defend Sunnite Sufism against a common enemy: Shah Ismail the Safavid ruler of Iran who sought to spread the Shiite religion in neighboring countries to conquer and annex them later on. Shah Ismail sought ardently to destroy this Sunnite alliance by making both parties distrust each other – through rumors made by his agents and spies – until he made the Mameluke troops side with him in his war against the Ottomans. The Mamelukes were not ready for such fighting; the Ottomans had no intentions before this to destroy the Mameluke sultanate; yet, it collapsed very quickly and unexpectedly as Selim I conquered Egypt. This was hardly expected when Al-Ghoury went to Aleppo to reconcile Shah Ismail and the Ottoman caliph. This sudden collapse was because of the internal economic weakness of the Mameluke sultanate because trade route between Europe and India passing by it was deserted when the Portuguese discovered the Cape of Good Hope to reach India, making the Mamelukes lose a good source of money as a result.  

6- The relations among Shah Ismail, Selim I, and Al-Ghoury were very mysterious and intricate; we divide them here into two phases below to simplify them to our readers.

 

Phase I: The emergence of Shah Ismail of the Safavid dynasty:

1- Shah Ismail emerged in Persia in 905 A.H., and his great-grandfather and grandfather were Sufi sheikhs in Ardabil, revered and respected by rulers (e.g., Tamerlane) who assumed that these sheikhs performed miracles 

2- The father of Shah Ismail, named Haydar, converted to the Shiite Sufism and gathered many followers and disciples in Ardabil; the sultan Jihan Shah of Azerbaijan feared that Haydar might grow too powerful and he drove him out of his kingdom. Haydar went to Diyarbakir and married the daughter of its ruler, Hassan Al-Taweel. When Al-Taweel conquered Azerbaijan, Haydar returned to Ardabil and gathered many followers within his Sufi order, when Al-Taweel died, sheikh Haydar married the daughter of a sultan named Yacoub, and she gave him a son named Ismail in 892 A.H., who would be later on the Shah Ismail the Safavid ruler.         

3- Sheikh Haydar participated in armed political struggles using his own followers who were called the Qizilbash (or the redheads). Haydar was killed in a battle and his son, Ismail, was captured as a child and he tasted the bitterness of defeats. Ismail imitated the ways of his father within a Shiite Sufi order to gather many followers, and he used them as troops to conquer Khorasan, Azerbaijan, Tabriz, Baghdad, etc. while putting to death their rulers and he killed nearly one million man in his battles; his fierce soldiers used to prostate before him (from the manuscript no. 41 titled ''chronicles of the 10th  century A.H.).

 

How Shah Ismail the Safavid posed a threat to the Ottomans:

1- Before Selim I, Ottoman conquests were in Europe and the Balkans, but Selim I directed his conquests to Arab provinces as he was concerned with stopping the Shiite danger infiltrating from Persia which was ruled by Shah Ismail who preferred to conquer Arab provinces instead of facing other powers that aimed to conquer Eurasian plains. Thus, at first, the Ottomans never coveted Egypt or the Levant, the provinces of the Mameluke sultans who never waged war at the time against the Ottomans and the Safavids, as they Mamelukes were concerned only with defending their provinces against any Persian attacks.    

2- In contrast, Shah Ismail desired to form an empire and he was encouraged by the laxity of Bayezid II (father of Selim I) to spread and proselytize the Shiite religion in Anatolia of the Ottomans and around Konya so as to plan annexing Anatolia to his Safavid state by political manipulation of the Shiite religion. 

3- The endeavors of Shah Ismail resulted in armed rebellion against the Ottomans led by the Shiite head of clergymen (i.e., the Shah Qool), who managed to defeat and kill the Ottoman grand vizier. The Shah Qool had close ties with the prince Korkut (son of Bayezid II) who coveted his father's throne. The two princes Shahenshah and Murat, sons of prince Ahmed who was the brother of Selim I, converted to the Shiite religion, and this means that he Safavid danger infiltrated into the Ottoman dynasty members and inside Anatolia.   

4- This led Selim I to revolt against his brothers and family members as well as his father Bayezid II to replace him on the throne; Selim I was helped by the soldiers known as the Janissaries who found in Selim I a strong leader to combat Shah Ismail; thus, the Janissaries forced Bayezid II to cede his throne to Selim I. 

5- Before this revolt, Selim I realized the enormity of the Shiite threat when he was appointed as governor of Trabzon; he saw the intrigues, schemes, and military moves of Shah Ismail and feared that his brother Korkut might dethrone Bayezid II to rule instead and he would not pay attention to this grave danger. Selim was furious as his father, Bayezid II, dealt laxly and leniently with the Shiite revolt of Shah Qool in Anatolia.  

6- Once enthroned, Selim I confirmed his internal front and focused within the external front to face Shah Ismail; he massacred many Shiites of Anatolia and banished others to the European regions of the Ottoman caliphate so as to guard his rear/back when he would engage into a war against Shah Ismail.

 

How Shah Ismail posed a threat to the Mamelukes:

1- The armed struggle between the Sunnite Ottomans and the Shiite Safavids entailed that the Mamelukes must interfere and side with one of these two powers, because the Mameluke sultanate led the 'Islamic' world at the time and it had borders with both the Ottoman and the Safavid states.

2- It was expected that Al-Ghoury would side with the Sunnite Ottomans against the Shiite Shah Ismail who began the aggression also against the Mameluke lands in the Levant; yet, Shah Ismail managed to make Al-Ghoury side with him by intrigues and wiles of his agents inside the Mameluke sultanate, thus neutralizing this Sunnite power so as not to make it side with the Ottomans against the Safavids; in fact, Shah Ismail enjoyed watching the young Ottoman caliphate destroying the old Mameluke sultanate that was never helped by the cunning Shah Ismail who dragged it out of its security to meet its end, in his endeavors to crush Sunnite Sufism with his Shiite Sufism of his ancestors.  

3- We quote the chronological order of these events from the Egyptian historian Ibn Eyas in his book (Badaei Al-Zohor) who witnessed such events that changed the regional and international history radically. Ibn Eyas mentions that in 908 A.H., Shah Ismail attacked Aleppo on the borders of the Mameluke State, and this disturbed the conditions in Cairo, leading the sultan Al-Ghoury to hold a council for all the Mameluke princes for consultation about how to face Shah Ismail within preparing and mobilizing military troops. In 913 A.H., the Mameluke governor of Aleppo sent a letter to Al-Ghoury in Cairo that Shah Ismail attacked Aleppo, and the remnants of troops returning to Cairo told many tales about the atrocities committed there by the Safavid troops, and Al-Ghoury felt very much disturbed, and he held a council for all the Mameluke princes for consultation about sending military troops there; the troops were mobilized first at the Cairo citadel for the sultan to see, and this parade was witnessed by all princes and by an emissary of the Ottomans as well. News came that the Safavid troops passed the Euphrates to invade Iraq and this posed a threat to the Mameluke Levantine region, and the Mameluke governor there, after a period of laxity, mobilized the Turcoman soldiers to defend the Levant. Al-Ghoury paid the financial dues to the soldiers after a period of delay and he held a party to celebrate the Ottoman emissary and gave him the finest embroidered garments to honor him. Ibn Eyas mentions that later on, some of the soldiers of Shah Ismail were captured and beheaded, and some of the severed heads of the Qizilbash (named as such as they wore red headwear) were brought to be shown at the gates of the wall of Cairo, and Shah Ismail sent a letter to Al-Ghoury informing him that the atrocities committed by his soldiers were never upon his orders at all and that he was surprised by their deeds.         

 

Analysis of the above:

1- Ibn Eyas did not voice the official viewpoint of events; rather, he expressed the view of the Egyptian street at the time, as we discern from his mentioning that the governor of Aleppo and his troops narrated to people in Cairo the atrocities committed by soldiers of Shah Ismail.

2- When Ibn Eyas mentions news of 908 A.H., Shah Ismail was not known very much at the time and little information about his was available, but he mentions that Cairo was troubled by the threat of the Levantine borders of the Mameluke sultanate, and Al-Ghoury held a council with princes to discuss such a grave matter and to mobilize defense troops. As for news of 913 A.H., much details were known about the situation and about Shah Ismail, with the new event that an Ottoman emissary was honored and allowed to witness mobilization of troops; this means that correspondences existed between the Mameluke sultan and the Ottoman sultan to face the common Shiite enemy. Of course, skirmishes and minor attacks of the troops of Shah Ismail was a test balloon before thinking about waging a decisive full-fledged war against both the Ottomans and the Mamelukes.    

 

The policies of Shah Ismail with the Mameluke sultan Al-Ghoury:

1- Contacts between the Mamelukes and the Ottomans did not result in a successful alliance to ward off the Safavids; Shah Ismail changed his plans to prevent such Sunnite alliance, as he made Al-Ghoury feel threatened internally by Egyptian Shiites revolting against him any time and externally by Safavid troops attacking the Levant. Thus, Shah Ismail forced Al-Ghoury into a secret alliance with him against the Ottomans.  

2- Egyptian Shiites revolted in Upper Egypt in 911 A.H., incited by spies of Shah Ismail, but their rebellion was not successful. Shah Ismail tried to look for other allies. Ibn Eyas mentions that the Mamelukes arrested spies and agents of the Safavids who carried letters to European rulers to urge them to help him defeat Egypt as he would attack it with his infantry soldiers and they would attack the Egyptian coasts with their fleet. The Europeans had captured Tripoli, in Libya, months before this, and even the prince of Mecca arrested three spies/agents of Shah Ismail in Hejaz.   

3- Al-Beira province – located between the Safavid empire and the Mameluke borders – was attacked by the Safavid troops, and its ruler Azbek Khan tried in vain to defend the province, but he was defeated and killed by Shah Ismail. Ibn Eyas mentions that Al-Ghoury was very much troubled as he received this piece of news and held a council for the Mameluke prince for consultation to face the Safavid threat that aimed to invade the Levant and Egypt.

4- Shah Ismail adopted the policy of threatening Al-Ghoury; he sent an emissary to him carrying the severed head of Azbek Khan along with lines of Arabic poetry to brag of his military power and Shiite religion, composed by the poet Safy Eddine of Aleppo. Al-Ghoury received the emissary of Shah Ismail very well and within celebrations, but he prevented people contacting this emissary and made him heavily guarded in the Cairo citadel as if he were imprisoned.   

5- Ibn Eyas mentions that Shah Ismail recruited desert-Arabs and Bedouins inside Egypt as his agents, and they revolted against Al-Ghoury at the time when Shah Ismail conquered Al-Beira province and its residents allied themselves to him. 

6- Al-Ghoury feared that those Egyptians who claim to be descendants of Ali and Fatima would revolt against him as their Shiite tendency might overpower them; he confiscated some of their Waqfs (religious endowments) and made judges examine and reevaluate those who claim to be descendants of Ali to exclude those who could not prove this, in order to see if some of them were recruited as spies/agents for Shah Ismail or not.  

7- Ibn Eyas mentions that the emissaries of Shah Ismail and Al-Ghoury exchanged letters of harsh words and threats, and Al-Ghoury verbally abused the emissary of Shah Ismail in public and in the letters, though Al-Ghoury out of hypocritical flattery made pompous procession and celebrations to honor this powerful emissary, whose name was Tamer Bey. Suddenly the emissary of Selim I told Al-Ghoury that Bayezid II died and his son, Selim I, succeeded him to the Ottoman throne; Al-Ghoury wept in public for the death of his Ottoman ally. 

8- Ironically, endeavors of Shah Ismail led to more closed ties between the Al-Ghoury and Selim I; Al-Ghoury celebrated and honored the Ottoman emissary and was a mediator to reconcile Selim I and prince Kokand who was self-exiled in Egypt and other infuriated princes who fled from Istanbul when Selim I was enthroned and came to Egypt. Al-Ghoury sent sums of money to buy weapons, timber, and iron from the Ottomans, but Selim I gave him all that he wanted for free, using his fleet, and he gave Al-Ghoury his money back, along with a letter heaping praises on Al-Ghoury, as per words of Ibn Eyas.    

9- Thus, Al-Ghoury did not take advantage of Ottoman princes coming to Egypt (who desired to usurp the Ottoman throne) to get political gains from Selim I. This is unlike the previous Mameluke sultan Barsbay who made use of the presence of a self-exiled Ottoman prince in Egypt to force the Ottoman sultan Murat to accept to oblige him regarding certain demands. Al-Ghoury received Ottoman princes like Suleiman and Kokand, whereas prince Ahmed Bey joined the Safavid ruler. Al-Ghoury feared that Selim I might get angry as Egypt received ottoman princes who were furious by Selim I usurping the throne; Al-Ghoury sent his emissary with man gifts and a letter to congratulate Selim I and to act as mediator to reconcile him with the self-exiled princes, though the plague struck Egypt at the time and its conditions were bad, even Al-Ghoury was taken ill himself, as per Ibn Eyas. Yet, when Al-Ghoury was bent on fighting Selim I, he received the Ottoman prince Qassim Ibn Ahmed to spite his paternal uncle Selim I.        

 

Phase II: How Al-Ghoury allied himself to Shah Ismail, and the influence of such alliance on the collapse of the Mameluke sultanate:

How the polices of Shah Ismail with Al-Ghoury failed:

 Within the letter of the Ottoman sultan Bayezid II to A-Ghoury about Shah Ismail and his Qizilbash troops, he mentions that they were heretics and apostates (i.e., Rawafid) who rejected 'Islam' and must be fought to ward off their evil, and Al-Ghoury responded in his letter to him that he was willing to help the Ottomans in the military endeavors to defeat Shah Ismail to annihilate the 'Sufi Shiite infidels' and to crush the Safavids. Al-Ghoury mobilized and sent troops led by Jalal-Eddine Qansuh to the Levant to be ready to defend the borders against any possible Safavid attacks, and the Ottoman promised to send their own troops as well. Thus, it was a struggle between the Mameluke/Ottoman Sunnite Sufism and the Persian Shiite Sufism. Eventually, polices of threats and intimidations adopted by Shah Ismail with Al-Ghoury failed as the Ottomans and the Mamelukes became allies.      

 

How Shah Ismail changed his policies and allied himself to Al-Ghoury against Selim I:

1- Shah Ismail was furious that his policies ironically led to an alliance between the Sunnite sultans Selim I and Al-Ghoury that threatened him; he changed his policies with Al-Ghoury as he felt that Selim I was powerful and not as lenient and lax as Bayezid II and that the decisive moment was drawing nearer as Selim I was bent on crushing the Shiite threat. Shah Ismail decided to win the side of Al-Ghoury at any costs. 

2- Shah Ismail managed to make amends and reconcile with Al-Ghoury and both rulers made a secret alliance against Selim I, and secrecy and Taqiyya were arts mastered by Shiite spies and agents, of course.  

3- Shah Ismail had several Shiite agents and spies throughout the Mameluke domain from Libya to Iraq, and from southern Asia Minor to Hejaz and northern Sudan. The Shiite religion imposed on its adherents to ally themselves to the religion and never to the Sunnite rulers in any province. Some spies of the Shiites, working under Shah Ismail, came to Cairo, Egypt, while carrying banners of Sunnite Sufism (within Taqiyya) to join the class members of those who claim to be descendants of Ali and Fatima. Thus, they had authority and power within the Cairene streets. The Mameluke Egypt at the time used to spread this myth of Ali's descendants; one of these spies reached high stature to the extent that he was the close friend and a courtier of Al-Ghoury and he convinced him to secretly ally himself to Shah Ismail. This spy was Al-Sharif Al-Ajamy Al-Shanqajy.   

4- Ibn Eyas mentions that Al-Ghoury made Al-Shanqajy lead a procession of elephants to the Mameluke governor of the Levantine cities to help in the fight against the Ottomans; and this long journey made people spread the rumor that Al-Shanqajy died, but suddenly Al-Ghoury himself joined the troops of Al-Shanqajy in the Levantine regions and announced the alliance with Shah Ismail that was held as a secret before the battle of Marj Dabiq.  

5- Ibn Eyas was a historian in contact with the masses to get news to write in his book, and he never knew about the intrigues of the Mameluke palaces never entered by him; he never mentions any intrigues inside the palace of Al-Ghoury; we never know how Al-Shanqajy, the wily Shiite spy, managed to convince the old, senile Al-Ghoury to lead his troops himself to Marj Dabiq where he was defeated and killed under hooves of horses, and this resulted in the downfall of the Mameluke sultanate as Selim I invaded Egypt soon enough. 

6- In his book Al-Kawakib Al-Saera, the historian M. Najm-Eddine Al-Ghuzzi (of Gaza, Palestine) who was contemporary to these events mentions that Al-Shanqajy was a spy/agent of Shah Ismail who got too close to Al-Ghoury inside his palace, and suddenly, people saw Al-Ghoury marching with his troops to the Levant to fight Selim I, and he got killed during the battle of Marj Dabiq. We never know how Al-Shanqajy was too influential that he convinced Al-Ghoury to take this risk nor what he promised the sultan in the name of Shah Ismail.   

 But what was the influence of such new change on the Mameluke-Ottoman relations?

 

1- Before Al-Ghoury was enthroned, he Mameluke-Ottoman relations were good as long as each side never interfered in the affairs of provinces between their states, as some rulers of such provinces were loyal allies of the Mamelukes and some were the same with the Ottomans. Minor troubles occurred (between Qaitbay and Bayezid II and Mehmed II the Conqueror and between the Mameluke governor of a Levantine city), but both sides reconciled every single time. The emergence of Shah Ismail led eventually to the collapse of the Mameluke sultanate by Selim I who conquered Egypt.  

2- There was never troubles about the borders between the Mamelukes and Shah Ismail, unlike the case with the Mamelukes and the Ottomans. We tend to think that Al-Ghoury might have feared that the balance of power changed against him and for the side of the Ottomans when Selim I defeated Shah Ismail in the battle of Chaldiran; he might have feared that Selim I would conquer the Levantine northern regions (located at the Ottoman borders) that contained provinces of rulers loyal to the Mamelukes. This is why Al-Ghoury sided with Shah Ismail during the battle of Chaldiran; Ibn Eyas mentions that Al-Ghoury sent his troops to Aleppo, near the location of the battle of Chaldiran to be ready for any possible Ottoman attacks against the Levant and to see who would achieve victory after this battle. Selim I was furious to know of this move and that Al-Ghoury sided with Shah Ismail 

3- During the battle of Chaldiran in 1514 A.D., troops of the Ottomans and the Mamelukes never directly clashed as they faced the troops of Shah Ismail; yet, the ruler of Maraash (loyal to the Mameluke sultan) was murdered by Selim I because he did not allow reinforcement troops of the Ottomans to pass the city of Maraash, and thus, Selim I invaded Maraash and sent the severed head of its ruler to Al-Ghoury who was furious to lose his ally in the Levant and because Selim I might think of conquering the rest of the Levantine cities and then Egypt; such news created troubles in Cairo and people feared the worst was yet to occur.

4- Ibn Eyas mentions that Al-Ghoury felt very sad as Selim I won the battle of Chaldiran and defeated Shah Ismail, as he never celebrated this victory and all Mameluke princes feared that Selim I might conquer the Levant and Egypt. Al-Ghoury forced his deputy ruler in the Levant to marry his daughter to ensure his loyalty if a war would break out between the Ottomans and the Mamelukes in the Levant. 

5- This means that sending troops to Aleppo to watch events closely exposed the secret alliance of Al-Ghoury and Shah Ismail made by Al-Shanqajy; when Selim I sent the head of the ruler of Maraash to Al-Ghoury, this created more tensions that escalated before the battle of Marj Dabiq.   

 

Before the war between Al-Ghoury and Selim I:

1- After the battle of Chaldiran, Selim I was bent on fighting the Safavids in Persia to crush Shah Ismail for good; Al-Ghoury feared that Selim I would take revenge against him for this move in Aleppo; at the same time, Shah Ismail tried to spare himself a war after his defeat in the battle of Chaldiran. Thus, Shah Ismail endeavored to make Al-Ghoury fight Selim I in the Levant until Shah Ismail would prepare his military troops to ally himself to the Sunnite force that would emerge victorious. The Ottoman troops that headed to Persia were surprised by the Mameluke troops attacking them, but they defeated the Mameluke troops and killed Al-Ghoury in the battle of Marj Dabiq.  

2- Shortly before the battle of Marj Dabiq, Al-Ghoury prepared his military troops and made his military leaders swear on a copy of the Quran to be united against the Ottomans, while spreading fake news that the Ottomans desired to conquer the Levant and Egypt, as per Ibn Eyas.

3- Selim I sent troops to fight those of Shah Ismail, but he was surprised to see troops of Al-Ghoury in Aleppo,  and he sent two letters with two emissaries to Al-Ghoury to neutralize him while offering the pretexts of his fighting Shah Ismail; i.e., the Safavid troops massacred innocent people and wreaked havoc and sabotage in the region and such ''Rawafid'' infidels must be fought and massacred to preserve peace. By the end of the letters, Selim I asked for prayers from Al-Ghoury and his Sufi sheikhs for the sake of supporting God's sharia!

 

Conditions of the Ottoman decision of Selim I to fight Al-Ghoury:

1- A Shiite spy told the Ottomans the lie that the Shiite Safavid Qizilbash troops would fight on the side of Al-Ghoury and this proved to them that Al-Ghoury allied himself to Shah Ismail.

2- Selim I in Konya received a letter from Al-Ghoury who headed his troops in the Levant that the only reason for his coming to the Levant was to reconcile the Safavids and the Ottomans so that bloodshed of innocent people would be avoided; he lied when he told Selim I that Shah Ismail intended never to fight the Ottomans after his defeat. Spies told Selim I that Al-Ghoury himself headed his troops in Aleppo, and Selim I made his troops that originally were sent to Persia to fight the Mameluke troops to prevent their joining the troops of Shah Ismail; Selim I never forgot that the Mamelukes had once defeated the Ottoman troops of his father Bayezid II.   

3- Spies of Selim I managed to steal a letter sent by Al-Ghoury to Shah Ismail to as for reinforcement troops to defeat the Ottomans; Selim I was furious by this proof of treachery. 

4- Correspondences exchanged between Selim I and Al-Ghoury failed to end this problem peacefully and the alliance and friendship were lost. Selim I even offered to hand over the city of Maraash to Al-Ghoury, who refused and insisted on the lie that his only aim was to reconcile the Ottomans and the Safavids; he advised Selim I never to fight Shah Ismail. At one point, Al-Ghoury imprisoned the emissaries of Selim I, who was infuriated by such insult and sent a military delegation to Al-Ghoury to threaten him with war; Al-Ghoury, feeling insulted, was bent on beheading the members of this delegation, but his vizier Younis Pacha, advised him not to do this.     

5- Selim I in his military council declared war against the Mamelukes in the Levant in 922 A.H. after he realized that Al-Ghoury was bent on fighting the Ottomans after he sided with Shah Ismail.

6- These were the conditions of the Ottoman decision of Selim I to fight Al-Ghoury, as all peaceful means failed to win back Al-Ghoury to the side of the Ottomans; Selim I decided to defeat the Mamelukes before crushing the Safavids, as he vowed to end the Mameluke and Safavid states, and he made Sunnite Sufi sheikhs praise his endeavors to annihilate the Shiite infidels/Rawafid who committed atrocities in the Levant.  

 But did Selim I actually desire to conquer the Levant and Egypt?

 

1- Our own reading of historical facts and events show that Selim I at first never intended to conquer Egypt, the Levant, or even Persia, though shah Ismail attacked Anatolia; the Ottomans focused on conquering European Christian regions, but the emergence of the Shiite Shah Ismail made the Ottoman policies change.

2- Selim I in one of his letter to Al-Ghoury in 922 A.H. asserts that his only purpose was to deter the Safavid troops ad defend the Sunnite sharia and religion and not to conquer Arab provinces ruled by Sunnite sultans nor Persian provinces ruled by Shiite sultans.

3- After the defeat and death of Al-Ghoury, the Levantine cities were conquered easily by Selim I, with the help of some Mameluke princes and agents who allied themselves to him. After Selim I conquered the whole Levantine regions, Tuman Bay, the last Mameluke sultan, received in Cairo a letter from the emissaries of Selim I to submit into the Ottoman rule peacefully without fighting. The same command was sent again by Selim I after the defeat of Tuman Bay, who took hiding in Upper Egypt, by the ottoman troops. At first, Tuman Bay accepted to rule Egypt in the name of the Ottomans and sent emissaries to Selim I to announce his acceptance; yet, some Mameluke princes murdered the Ottoman emissaries sent by Selim I to Tuman Bay while they exchanged correspondences; this made negotiations fail.         

4- Selim I at first did not have in his plans conquering the Levant and Egypt and he was furious to suffer heavy losses in his troops; he once shouted at his ally the Mameluke prince Khair Bey that he deceived him by convincing him to conquer Egypt; Selim I told Tuman Bay after his being captured and before putting him to death that he never intended or planned before to conquer Egypt and that he would not have done this if Tuman Bay would accept submission and to rule in his name by making coins and Friday sermons in the name of Selim I.     

 

How Shah Ismail schemed and plotted against Selim I after the death of Al-Ghoury

1- Shah Ismail was surprise by the sudden downfall of the Mameluke sultanate; this ottoman expansion prevented Shah Ismail from annexing Arab lands to his Safavid State. Shah Ismail decided to make his Shiite spies and agents in the Levant and Egypt spread many intrigues and rumors; yet Shah Ismail died suddenly at the age of 38 in 930 A.H. Before his death, Shah Ismail sent a letter to Selim I when he left Cairo and was in Damascus to congratulate him on annexing Egypt, the Levant, and Hejaz to serve holy sites of Islam and to propose peace treaties so as not to make the Ottomans conquer Persian lands of the Safavids and he vowed never to attack Ottoman borders. Selim I never trusted him and refused to conclude any peace treaties; he sent troops led by his grand vizier Beiry Mehmet Pacha in Diyarbakir to watch any movements of Shah Ismail closely.    

2- At the same time, Shah Ismail continued his conspiracies against the Ottomans in the Levant by his Shiite spies and agents; upon Shah Ismail's orders, some of his agents, months after the collapse of the Mameluke sultanate, roamed the markets of Damascus and kept wailing for the death of Hussein in Karbala.  

3- Shah Ismail betted on the ambitions of local Levantine princes, and he made the Shiite prince of Sidon, Ibn Hanash, become his chief ally. As per history book of Ibn Tulun, Shah Ismail urged Ibn Hanash to revolt against the Ottoman rule, and the rebels were joined by other Shiite rulers of some of the Levantine cities. Such revolt increased once Selim I left Damascus and went to Aleppo. The revolt ended once Ibn Hanash and other Shiite rulers were killed and defeated by the Ottoman military leader Jan Beirdy, who was appointed as the governor of the whole Levant, as a reward, to rule in the name of the Ottomans. Shah Ismail never despaired and managed to win Jan Beirdy to his side; Jan Beirdy revolted against his Ottoman masters and announced his independent rule, but he was defeated soon enough.        

4- Shiite spies and agents of Shah Ismail in the Ottoman Egypt ever ceased to conspire and obey all commands of the Safavids; for instance, when Selim I fought troops of Shah Ismail in Tabriz, Persia, a Sufi sheikh named Dhahir-Eddine Al-Ardabili (who was a Safavid Shiite spy) managed to be among the courtiers of Selim I  and he deceived everyone by pretending to be a Sunnite Sufi sheikh. Selim I admired him so much that he made him accompany him in Istanbul and gave him 80 dirhams as a daily wages. Dhahir-Eddine Al-Ardabili, upon commands of Shah Ismail, managed to convince  Ahmed Pacha (a high-rank military leader under Selim I) to convert to the Shiite religion and to rebel against the Ottomans, but Ahmed Pacha was defeated and killed. 

5- Hence, the Sunnite Ottomans defeated and crushed the Shiite Safavid state as Selim I conquered Persia. This means that Sunnite Sufism became dominant for centuries while the Shiite religion hidden behind a thin veneer of Sufism lost the chance of being propagated for centuries. 

6- The Sufi element dominated the Ottoman Era in Egypt and elsewhere more than the Sunnite element in the Sunnite Sufi religion; the Sunnite element was manifested only in other acts of worship   and prayers (performed in mosques filled with mausoleums of Sufi saints worshipped and venerated by everyone and names of saints were given to these mosques). Thus, even the Sunnite element served the 'holy' Sufi saints and not the other way round. 

 

References:

 The historical data about the conflict between Ismail the Safavid, Selim I the Ottoman, and Al-Ghoury of Egypt are taken from printed sources and manuscripts written by historians who were contemporaries of such events. Firstly: manuscripts in the Egyptian Public Library (Dar Al-Kotob), in Cairo: chronicles of the 10th century A.H. manuscript no. 41, history of Selim I and Al-Ghoury, manuscript no 13 and no. 14 history of Taymour, manuscript no. 67 and no. 68 within vol. no 2026 history of Marei Al-Hanbali, manuscript no. 133 and no. 134 governors of Egypt by Al-Bakry, manuscript no. 22 in vol. no. 2407 history of Taymour, and manuscript no.2/533 about history of Jerusalem. Secondly: printed editions of authoritative books of history: History of Ibn Eyas part 4, p. 39, 118, 123, 152-167, 186-187, 191, 205, 219, 221, 260, 265, 271, 285, 289, 324, 398-399, 402-404, 471:475, and 483, and part 5, p. 22 and 35-38. History of Ibn Hajar part 3, p. 499-500. History of Ibn Tulun part 2, p. 23, 74-75, and 78-79. Al-Kawakib Al-Saeera, chapter about battles and conquests, part 1, p. 159, 216, and 297. History of Ibn Zanbal Al-Ramal, about Selim I and Al-Ghoury, p. 133-136.