This week will witness two new demonstrations of Russian military support for Bashar Al-Assad’s beleaguered regime:  the delivery of advanced Yakhont anti-ship missiles for Syria’s coastal defense forces; and the docking of Russian warships at the Syrian city of Tartus, Russia’s only port facility on the Mediterranean. At a time when Assad is struggling brutally against a massive popular uprising, while other nations are imposing sanctions and embargoes against his government, these strong Russian signals of support are a significant anomaly worthy of critical examination.

The issue is sharpened by continuing evidence that close Syrian-Russian military ties correspond with equally good relations in the political arena, even today. On December 12, even as Arab media headlined general strikes and more political killings in several major Syrian cities, Russian media, parroting the official Syrian public relations apparatus, focused on the “relatively high turnout” in supposedly “calm, peaceful, and orderly” Syrian local elections.  Given the timing, this effusion suggests that Russia’s political cover for Assad’s increasingly bloody but tenuous grasp on power will not be affected by the current controversy over Russia’s own contested parliamentary election.  Indeed, some analysts see Putin’s expected resumption of the presidency as a harbinger of ever more hardline Russian support for the dictator in Damascus.

Above and beyond the obvious military, economic, and diplomatic benefits Assad derives from this Russian support, his regime exploits it for whatever political and propaganda advantages it may be worth. On November 21, for instance, Syria’s official news agency featured Assad’s remark to a Russian delegation that “We appreciate Russia’s objective stance toward events in Syria.”  On December 12, the news agency carried this banner headline:  “The Reality of Events -- Russian ZavtraNewspaper:  Turkey Directly Involved in Terrorist Operations Against Syria.”

What accounts for this stubborn Russian policy, so much at odds with a growing international consensus against Syria’s weakened strongman?  In part, that question answers itself:  Moscow is determined to prove precisely that it follows its own line, regardless of Western and especially U.S. opinion.  In part also, Russian support for Assad reflects a stand against the very notion of foreign intervention in another country’s internal affairs – particularly in the name of democracy.   The specter of Western nations “replacing a whole chain of Middle Eastern governments at will,” as one Russian television commentator recently put it, is surely distasteful to the Kremlin.

All of these defiant Russian impulses were greatly boosted by the latest developments in Libya.  In that case, in just the past few months, a Russian-supported UN Security Council resolution ostensibly aimed only at protecting innocent civilians ultimately served as “cover,” in Moscow’s view, for the NATO military intervention that toppled Qadhafi’s once Russian-backed regime.  Against this background, Russia (backed by China) vetoed a November draft resolution censuring Assad’s regime.  On December 7, Russian President Medvedev publicly declared that his government’s approach to “the excruciating trouble” in Syria derives not only from its “age-old friendship” with that country, but also “from its determination to preclude attempts to violate international law.”  For emphasis, he added that “the main thing now” is for Syrians to “start a nationwide dialogue” and “end violence” -- but “without interference from abroad.”

Mevedev’s “age-old” formulation points to several additional factors underlying the lingering Moscow-Damascus axis.  Beyond Syria’s port facilities, arms deals, and other Russian economic interests worth an estimated 2-3 billion dollars annually, the long record of tight bilateral ties would present Moscow with a major credibility problem if it tried to switch sides to the Syrian opposition – and a likely loss of influence in case that opposition actually takes over.   On top of that is the problem of Moscow’s efforts to coordinate policies on this crisis with both Iran and Hizballah.  In the past few months, Russia hosted an official Hizballah parliamentary delegation for the first time; and it continue to call for dialogue rather than additional sanctions on both Iran and Syria.

Yet there is, in addition, one final, overarching factor that few outside analysts ever mention – and it may hold the key to changing Russian policy, and thus depriving Assad of one of his last remaining bases of foreign support.  That is the very deeply ingrained Russian suspicion, verging on paranoia, about the Islamist character of some leading Syrian dissidents.  For example, on several recent Arabic-language international talk shows with this author, Russian foreign policy advisor Aleksandr Matuzov dwelt at length on the historic “anti-Russian” extremism and violence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, going as far back as the 1970s.  (He did not dwell on the fact that such violence persists even inside the Russian Federation, in places like Chechnya, Daghestan, Tatarstan and elsewhere – although this was probably on his mind as well.)  As Russians look out at the ascent of Islamists to positions of power in Tunisia, Egypt, or Libya (and now possibly Yemen) when old regimes fall, they naturally fear a similar outcome in the one Arab country where Russia retains a leading role:  Syria.

Paradoxically, this anti-Islamist Russian reflex may offer an opportunity for Assad’s opponents to allay some of Moscow’s concerns.  Russian officials have actually hosted a Syrian opposition delegation at least once recent6ly, on September 9, but with inconclusive results.  Next time, these Syrian dissidents would be well advised to emphasize two points to their Russian hosts:  First, they are not all Islamists.  Second, equally if not more important, even the Islamists among them would be willing to maintain decent political, economic, and perhaps even military relations with Russia, once they succeed in overthrowing Assad’s regime.

Making such an appeal public, difficult as this would certainly be, would add considerably to its conviction, probably without jeopardizing Western, Arab, and Turkish support.  And without seizing whatever opportunities may exist to alter Russia’s die-hard support for Assad, the battle to replace him will be far tragically longer and bloodier than it needs to be.