On June 23, the Basra Provincial Council voted to “ban the entry of U.S. forces into the city” and demand U.S. forces withdrawal from Basra’s airport by twenty-nine votes in favor to nine votes against. Four days later, U.S. forces accompanying the U.S. Basra Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) were asked to either leave the local government’s building or surrender their weapons (in the past, only non-government foreign security guards had to disarm). Other U.S. and foreign convoys in Basra have since been disrupted by uncooperative police forces. The Basra Provincial Council’s decision is not isolated, but is part of a campaign in southern Iraq that includes five of the nine provinces. Though the legality of the council’s decision is in question, it underlines the continuous use of provincial councils to achieve objectives on the national level.
In issuing its decision, the Basra Provincial Council followed the steps of its counterparts in Najaf, Maysan, Thiqar, and Wasit. This Sadrist trend began in Najaf when the motion was discussed and rejected by the provincial council on May 22 due to some members’ concerns that only the federal government has the authority to regulate the presence of U.S. forces. By comparison, Thiqar’s council stopped short of coming to a decision by issuing a statement, rendering the action less binding. In contrast, members of the councils in Maysan and Wasit were successful in ushering decisions that call for banning the entry of U.S. forces into the cities on May 30 and June 6 respectively.
The legality of the councils’ decisions is ambiguous. According to Iraq’s Law 21, which details the authorities of the provinces, the councils have the power to “issue local legislations…and instructions that do not contradict the constitution and federal laws.” However, Article 110 of the constitution grants the federal authorities the exclusive rights of “drafting the national security policy [of the country] and implementing it.” Under the U.S.-Iraq security agreement (which is valid until December 31, 2011), U.S. forces are authorized by the federal government to operate within Iraq. Provincial councils in Wasit, Maysan, and Basra have not met the stipulations of Law 21’s Article 10 (Section 7), which enables provincial councils to review and approve security plans presented by the local security authorities through the governor and “in coordination with the federal security directorates.” It remains to be seen if the Federal Supreme Court will step in with a decision determining the legality of these votes.
The Sadrist movement has taken full credit for initiating the provincial council votes on U.S. presence. Its leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, issued a statement in the aftermath of the Najaf council decision saying “we call for spreading such decisions to all the provinces.” The Sadrists are attempting to prove and increase their popularity on the provincial level where the politics remain fluid and competitive. Al-Sadr may be calculating the possibility of a new security agreement to be passed by the Iraqi Council of Representatives. The Sadrist-initiated motions are likely a face-saving tactic intended to convey a message to their supporters that they attempted to block the passage of a new security agreement by all means at their disposal.
An alternative interpretation of the votes suggests trouble for any future U.S.-Iraqi agreement. The Sadrists have cleverly forced Iraqi legislators into a corner. In Wasit, those who did not vote for the motion were described as “beneficiaries of these forces staying in the country and the continuation of Iraq’s occupation.” The tactic of “naming and shaming” was apparently effective: in Basra, for instance, only two of thirty-five seats are held by Sadrists, yet twenty-six members voted for the motion to ban U.S. forces. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s strong majority in the Basra council (20 of 35 seats) did not prevent the vote. This suggests either a fissure in Maliki’s local alliances or concerns about its perception in the public’s eyes. To seize initiative, Maliki must stop the spread of these votes to other provincial councils by stating his position publicly on a new security agreement in coordination with the other political parties. In conclusion, Maliki’s options may be hindered by the provincial politics. If he makes the decision to pursue a new security agreement, he is likely to overlook the provincial council decisions by citing the constitutional authority of the central government.
Ahmed Ali is a research associate at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy focusing on the political dynamics of Iraq, including democratization, Arab-Kurdish relations, Kirkuk, national reconciliation, and relations between the legislative and executive branches of the Iraqi government. Previously, he was a consultant for the Education for Peace in Iraq Center (EPIC), a Washington-based nonprofit organization, where he analyzed Iraqi political and social trends.