country then justified any abuse of torture happened to few people. General Medina said:
“In many instances the life of our comrades was in danger, and it was necessary to get information quickly. That is what made it necessary to compel them. But after that was done, the subject would just become one more prisoner. That was the focus of our struggle.” (Weschler)
Away from the Uruguayan example, one would notice that after the transition to democracy was done, and while facing the dilemma of trailing the perpetrators, there was a relation between how powerful the military was after the transition and how far could justice be achieved. The more powerful the military was; the lesser chances available for trails. In Argentina, where the transition happened only because of the collapse of the military, trails were held for the violent policy makers. In Uruguay, where the military was powerful under the rule of general Medina, no trails but there was truth commission. In Chile, where Pinochet stayed in power as the head of military after his defeat in the referendum and then as a senator, only truth commissions, but no trails, took place. In Rwanda, where the number of killings was massive-about 800000 people killed- and the number of suspects was huge as well-around 100000, trails took place, just because the military was not as involved in the massacre as the militaries of Latin America. Trails in Rwanda took place in spite of how poor the country was. So all other economic or social reasons not to have trails boil out leaving only the strength of the military as the main cause.