> Almost a week of countrywide protests in Turkey have left an
> indelible mark on the countryâs political landscape: broad
> discontent with the policies of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
> Erdoganâs policies and increasing haughtiness bubbled to the
> surface; militant soccer fans thousands of whom joined the Taksim
> Square protests united and were politicized; and the role police
> force plays in solidifying opposition groups and resolve was
> highlighted.
> Mr. Erdoganâs intransigence and hard-handed police attempts to
> suppress the protest with tear gas and water cannons swelled the
> ranks of the demonstrators and turned a demand for perseverance of a
> 75-year old Istanbul park into a massive call for the prime
> ministerâs resignation. Thousands of militant fans of Istanbulâs
> three rival soccer clubs led by the left-wing, most politicized of
> the support groups Carsi, the ultrasâ of Besiktas JK, joined
> forces for the first time in 30 years as they march to Taksim
> Square. So did rival soccer fans in other cities.
> Comparisons between Taksim and Cairoâs Tahrir Square that has come
> to symbolize the ability of the street to topple a government are
> tempting. To be sure, there are superficial similarities but these
> are outstripped by the differences. The two square share the
> unification of rival soccer fans with a history of fighting one
> another; the occupation of a main city square; the protestersâ
> slogan: Erdogan, istifa! or Erdogan resign in imitation of Egyptâs
> Mubarak irhal! or Mubarak leave!; the violent police crackdown; and
> the ultimate at least partial government backdown.
> But unlike mass demonstrations that toppled leaders in North African
> nations, the protests in Turkey are against a democratically elected
> leader who has won three elections with a respectable majority,
> presided over a period of significant economic growth and
> repositioned his country as a regional power with global ambitions.
> They also occurred in contrast to Arab countries in a country that
> despite all its warts is democratic and has a strongly developed,
> vociferous civil society.
> The Taksim protests in the week that Istanbul celebrated its capture
> by the Ottomans 560 years ago have sent Mr. Erdogan an unambigious
> message: discontent with the prime ministerâs authoritarian
> streak, the Turkish governmentâs support of Sunni Muslim rebels in
> Syria, increasing government control of large chunks of the media
> and attempts to stifle independent reporting and commentary, and
> suspicion that he is attempting to Islamize public life is mounting.
> The protests constitute a warning that maintenance of his style of
> government could as yet turn Taksim into Tahrir.
> A decision by the diverse, uncoordinated groups that came together
> on Taksim not to occupy the square and build a semi-permanent tent
> camp to press their demands for reversal of their demands for
> preservation of the park that is to be replaced by a shopping mall,
> an apology by the police for its heavy handed use of force and
> resignation of the Erdogan government has taken the wind out of the
> protests. The momentum has temporarily shifted in favor of Mr.
> Erdogan but to retain it Turks will have to see a real change in his
> style of governing. Mr. Erdogan benefits from the fact that with no
> soccer league matches scheduled for the foreseeable future,
> stadiums, a traditional protest venue in a soccer-crazy country,
> militant soccer fans are deprived of their natural organizing grounds.
> Despite this, major questions remain that need to be addressed and
> answered to prevent soccer fans and thousands of others from
> returning to Taksim and other city squares across Turkey. Will Mr.
> Erdogan back off his plans to redevelop Taksim that has already led
> to the shutting down of the squareâs historic bakery, Inci
> Pastanesi, and its iconic Emek Theater? Mr. Erdogan responded to
> this weekâs Gezi Part protest by saying the government would push
> ahead with its Gezi Park plan âno matter what they do.â The
> prime minister warned that he could put 100 people on the street for
> every anti-government protester.
> For much of the week, events on Taksim and in other Turkish cities
> were underrreported in much of the media in Turkey, which ranks high
> on the list of media-unfriendly countries according to the number of
> incarcerated journalists. The government strengthened in May its
> grip on the media with its takeover from financially troubled
> Cukurova holding television stations and Digiturk pay-tv. The
> underreporting was allegedly after government phone calls to various
> media.
> The explosion of discontent allowed secularists with the opposition
> Republican Peopleâs Party (CHP) in the lead to turn the protests
> into alleged Islamization of society. Secularists point to this
> monthâs new restriction on the sale and consumption of alcohol and
> the naming of a third, controversial Istanbul bridge that spans the
> Bosporus as the Yavuz Sultan Selim or Selim the Grim Bridge in honor
> of the Ottoman sultan widely blamed for the massacre of Alevis in
> the early 16th century. Alevis, accounting for an estimated 20
> percent of the population, although distinct from Syrian President
> Bashar al-Assadâs Alawite community see Mr. Erdoganâs support
> for Syriaâs Sunni Muslim rebels has further disregard of their
> concerns and have tapped into widespread popular dislike of the
> governmentâs anti-Bashar policy.
> An interior ministry investigation into the policeâs crackdown on
> Taksim ordered by Mr. Erdogan will also have to clarify whether the
> crackdown reflected the split between the prime minister and
> Fethullalh Gulen, who is also opposed to unrestricted Turkish
> support for the Syrian rebels. Mr. Gulen, a powerful, self-exiled,
> Pennsylvania-based cleric, is believed to wield considerable
> influence within the police force.
> The two men have clashed in the past year over measures to prevent
> match-fixing after Turkey was rocked by a major match-fixing
> scandal. Mr. Erdogan defeated Mr. Gulenâs attempts to ensure harsh
> penalties which would have weakened the prime ministerâs grip and
> potentially strengthened the clerics influence in Fenerbahce FC,
> which has a fan base of millions.
> âErdogan is smarter than the Egyptians. He lets people
> demonstrate. He caters to the rights of the religious and the Kurds
> to garner votes and ignores the secularists. The fans are largely
> secular. This weekâs demonstrations have shown that one can stand
> against the government and that soccer fans can work together.
> Things will settle for a few weeks. But Erdogan is on notice,â
> said a soccer fan as he marched against the government in Izmir.
> James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of
> International Studies, director of the University of Würzburgâs
> Institute of Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of
> Middle East Soccer<http://mideastsoccer.
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